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22 ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

In the latter case no actual prejudice is likely to result, because the
record is ordinarily accessible, and the pleading has notified the
defendant of its importance.
If -no conviction has taken place he will naturally deny it on
cross-examination. If there has been some sort of conviction in
fact, but legally defective, as for want of jurisdiction, or insufficiency of the charge to state the necessary offense, or from a failure
to enter the judgment as not infrequently happens on a plea of
guilty in an inferior court, the defendant is in a position to produce
the record itself and thus disclose the legal objection. In case of
documents of which the defendant has no notice or warning, and
which he may not be able to obtain in the midst of a trial, a crossexamination may be manifestly unfair and prejudicial. He may
be forced to make general admissions as to the contents and effect
of documents when he is in no position to correct erroneous impressions or raise legal objections by producing the instrument
itself.
If the rule is strictly confined to situations like that in the
principal case, there is no great practical objection. On the other
hand there is no positive reason for breaking in on the general rule,
because the prosecution ought to be prepared to produce the record
alleged in the information. And our law of evidence is complicated
enough without making unnecessary exceptions. If the exception
is not strictly confined it leads to all the objections which the best
evidence rule was designed to prevent.
E. W. HINTON.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-POWER OF STATE TO

REGULATE PRICE OF RESALE OF THEATRE TIcKETS By BRO-KERS.-

[United States] In Tyson & Bros.-United Theatre Ticket Offices,
Inc. v. Banton" the federal Supreme Court has just decided a question
of much interest to theatre-goers of our larger cities. A New York
statute2 required a license from those engaged in the business of
reselling theatre tickets, and criminally forbade a charge of more
than fifty cents a ticket by licensees for this service. It was admitted that this price afforded a reasonable return for the service.
Plaintiff, a corporation engaged in the business of reselling in New
York City yearly about 300,000 theatre tickets out of a total of
about 2,000,000 thus resold, sought an injunction in the local federal
district court against the enforcement of this law by the local state
district attorney. From a decree denying this, plaintiff appealed
and secured a reversal in his favor by a five to four decision of
the Supreme Court.
The opinion of the majority by Mr. justice Sutherland proceeds
chiefly upon the ground that the price at which theatres sell tickets
cannot be regulated for lack either of an historical sanction (such
as exists for inns, carriers, and grist mills) or of a sufficient public
necessity for it-if the price of food and of rents can be limited
1. (1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 426.
2. New York Laws 1922 ch. 590 secs. 167, 168. 172.

COMMENT ON RECENT CASES

only in emergencies, a fortiori is this true of amusements; and
that the power to regulate the resale price of tickets depends upon
the same considerations. Dissenting opinions by Justices Stone
and Sanford, concurred in by Justices Holmes and Brandeis, emphasize the fact that the question is not of the power to regulate
the price at which theatre owners may originally sell tickets, but
to regulate the price brokers may charge for their services intermediate between the producer and the customer, well compared
by Mr. Justice Sanford to the elevator services between producers
and consumers of grain, permitted to be regulated as to price in
Munn v. Il1inois3 quite apart from any suggestion that this was
dependent upon the power to regulate the sale price of the grain
itself. To the writer this seems the preferable analysis of the
matter. The facts showed that the ticket brokers of New York
subscribed regularly in advance of each production for all of the
best seats in the first-class theatres of New York for a period
of eight weeks, these advance sales operating in favor of the producers as an insurance against the losses on unsuccessful plays, and
giving to the brokers a virtual monopoly of the seats thus purchased
which enabled them to make excessive profits from resales to the
public. About 25% of unsold tickets could be returned to the
theatres. The "brokers" were thus partly true brokers and partly
outright purchasers of the tickets, but their position was essentially
that of middlemen, occupying a position of marked economic advantage with regard to the ticket-buying public on account of this
arrangement with the theatre owners. Considering this difference in
function between brokers and producers, it does not seem unreasonable to regulate the charge of the broker for his services, even
though admitting that perhaps the producer's price could not be
limited.
The principles suggested by Mr. Justice Stone as governing
statutory price regulation are also more satisfactory generalizations
than those usually attempted. He says:
"The phrase 'business affected with a public interest' seems to me
to be too vague and illusory to carry us very far on the way to a solution. . . . It is difficult to use the phrase free of its connotations of
legal consequences, and hence, when used as a basis of judicial decision,
to avoid begging the question to be decided. .
"The constitutional theory that prices normally may not be regulated rests upon the assumption that the public interests and private
right are both adequately protected when there is 'free' competition
between buyers and sellers, and that, in such a state of economic society, the interference with so important an incident of the ownership of
private property as price fixing is not justified, and hence is a taking of
property without due process of law.
"Statutory regulation of price is commonly directed toward the
prevention of exorbitant demands of buyers or sellers. An examination of the decisions of this court in which price regulation has been
upheld will disclose that the element common to all is the existence of a
3. (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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situation or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the
regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at
such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious economic
consequences result to a very large number of members of the community. Whether this situation- arises from the monopoly conferred
upon public service companies, or from the circumstance that the strategical position of a group is such as to enable it to impose its will in
matters of price upon those who sell, buy, or consume, as in Munn v.
Illinois supra; or from the predetermination of prices in the councils
of those who sell, promulgated in schedules of practically controlling
cornstancy, as in German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas 233 U. S. 389; or
frorm a housing shortage growing out of a public emergency, as in
Bloqk v. Hirsh 256 U. S. 135; Marcus Brozut Co. v. Feldman 256 U. S.
170; Levy Leasing Co. v. "Siegel258 U. S. 242 (cf. Chastleton Corp. v.
Sinclair 264 U. S. 543)-the result is the same. Self-interest is not
permitted to invoke consfitutional protection at the expense of the public interest, and reasonable regulation of price is upheld.
"That should result here. . . . Nor is the exercise of the power
less reasonable because the interests protected are in some degree less
essential to life than some others. Laws against monopoly, which aim
at the same evil and accomplish their end by interference with private
rights quite as much as the present law, are not regarded as arbitrary
or unreasonable or unconstitutional because they are not limited in
their application to dealings in the bare necessities of life."4
This seems a fair and workable rationalization of the leading
cases upon the subject, and one which leaves the doctrine properly
flexible for the future.
JAMES PARKER HALL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEPARATION OF POWERS-POWER OF
SENATE TO ATTACH WITNESS FOR REFUSAL TO TESTIFY BEFORE
COIMITTEE.- [United States] The long-awaited decision in McGrain
v. Daugherty' was handed down on January 17, 1927, upholding the
power of the Senate committee, appointed to investigate certain
official conduct of Attorney-General Harry M. Daugherty, to compel
the attendance and testimony of his brother, Mally S. Daugherty,
a banker doing business at V.ashington Court House, Ohio. Two
subpoenas had been served on M. S. Daugherty by the Senate
committee, one requiring him to produce certain books and papers
of the bank, the other merely requiring his appearance to give
testimony relating to the subject under consideration. Both had
been disregarded, but the Senate by resolution had ordered the attachment of his person only to bring him before the Senate to
answer questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry, with a
recital that his presence was necessary in order that the committee
"may obtain information necessary as a basis for such legislative
and other action as the Senate may deem necessary and proper."
The witness, having been taken into custody in Cincinnati by a
deputy sergeant-at-arms of the Senate, was released on habeas
4. 47 Sup. Ct., at 435-36.
1. (1927) 47 Sup. Ct. 319.

